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CONSENTABILITY, AUTONOMY, AND SELF
ACTUALIZATION
Jonathan Witmer-Rich
Nancy Kim's Consentability provides a fascinating exploration
of the many thorny problems in consent theory and practice-such
as whether individuals should be permitted to voluntarily inflict
self-harm, and whether they should be permitted to sell body parts
or personal (body-based) services.
Kim articulates several
principles designed to help decision-makers understand and
evaluate whether and how consent can operate in these arenas and
others. Her contributions include the Regret Principle and.
evaluating consent's impact on Future Autonomy.
In this response essay, I will engage with Kim's contributions
by focusing on the competing principles underlying consent. These
include:
1. protecting and furthering the individual's self

interest ("Self-Interest")
2. protecting a right to autonomy grounded on an
inherent right to self-sovereignty ("Self
Sovereignty")
3. protecting a right to autonomy grounded on the
value of self-actualization and self-governing
("Self-Actualization")
Kim, relying on foundational authorities such as J.S. Mill and Joel
Feinberg, articulates and puts to good use all of these conceptions.
I offer several points in response to Kim. First, I contend that
clearly delineating the overlapping but distinct principles that
underlie consent is critical for any conceptual project, like Kim's,
seeking to propose a framework for consent. Second, I argue that
clearly adopting one (or more) of those distinct principles would
help guide decision-making in hard cases. Third, throughout this
response I will argue that promoting the good of Self
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Actualization-as articulated by Joseph Raz-is the most
appealing and valuable way for the law to evaluate consent.
This essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I will follow Kim's
lead in articulating the various foundational principles that might
underlie the normative power of consent. Here I highlight how
these foundational principles contain substantial overlap, which
often leads commentators to use them interchangeably, but
emphasize how these overlapping principles are different in crucial
respects. In Parts II and III, I will illustrate how these conceptual
distinctions matter by turning to two of Kim's central rubrics for
consentability: Impacts on Future Autonomy, and the "Regret
Principle."

I. CONSENT DEBATES AND UNDERLYING
JUSTIFICATIONS
Various underlying justifications for consent overlap
substantially, but still represent fundamentally different versions
of consent. Carefully distinguishing among these underlying
conceptions prevents us from silently shifting our arguments from
one to the other, and lays bare the value choices to be made in
formulating the law of consent.
The first distinction is that between autonomy and self
interest. In her conclusion, Kim notes that "[t]he purpose of
consent it to empower individuals, to give them a tool with which
to exercise autonomy and maximize their self-interest." 1 These two
values--exercising autonomy and maximizing self-interest-are
very frequently in accord. Increasing an individual's autonomy
often also enables her to maximize her self-interest. Likewise,
empowering an individual to maximize her own self-interest often
increases and promotes her individual autonomy. Kim discusses
both concepts throughout her book. 2
At the same time, self-interest and autonomy are different
values, and in hard cases they can result in different analyses and
outcomes. Autonomy is about the ability to make choices-which
can include making bad choices that diminish one's own interests.
A person who freely and voluntarily chooses an option that
conflicts with her own interests has nevertheless acted
autonomously. Maximizing self-interest, in contrast, is not just

1. NANCY 8. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 218 (2019).
2. See id. at 15, 41, 53-55, 74-78.
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about the ability to make the choice, but about evaluating the
outcome of that choice-did it serve the chooser's self-interest?
Kim discusses, as one concrete example, individuals who seek
serious modifications of their own bodies, such as through breast
enhancement surgery or elective amputation. 3 If our fundamental
value is autonomy, we might choose to respect individuals'
decisions to elect severe and permanent body modifications, even
if we have grave doubts about whether those choices will serve
their long-term interests. In contrast, if our fundamental value is
protecting and furthering each individual's self-interest, we might
intervene to restrict their autonomous choice when we have
sufficiently serious concerns about harm to their long-term
interests.
John Stuart Mill famously argued that insofar as we seek to
maximize individuals' self-interest, we should defer to their own
judgment. Kim quotes Mill, who argues that an individual's
"voluntary choice is evidence that what he chooses is desirable, or
at the least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best
provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing
it." 4 Mill argues this point further: the community's interest in an
individual "is fractional, and altogether indirect: while, with
respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary
man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing
those that can be possessed by any one else." 5 When the state or
community judges what is best for an individual's own interests,
that judgment "must be grounded on general presumptions; which
may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to
be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted
with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at
them merely from without." 6 Accordingly, "in each person's own
concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise ....
All errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning,
are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him
to what they deem his good." 7
Mill's claim is here somewhat contingent--contingent on the
idea that an individual is, in fact, the best judge of their own
3. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 22-32, 175-187
(2019).
4. Id. at 91 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 110 (1859)).
5. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 70 (1859).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 71.
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interests. As Mill states, it may often be the case that each
individual will better judge, compared with some third party such
as the state, what will best serve their own self-interest. But there
may also be cases in which that self-interest is better served by
limiting the individual's own (faulty) decision-making in favor of
the decision-making of some third party (possibly the state).
Embracing the fundamental principle of "protecting each
individual's self-interest" means we must be open to at least
evaluating the argument, in given cases, that certain choices are
very likely to harm an individual's self-interest rather than
advance it. Further, this principle also suggests that at times,
allowing the state (or some other third party) to direct certain
decisions will better serve that individual's self-interest.
Instead of focusing on self-interest, we might instead choose
to be centrally concerned with protecting individual autonomy. If
we focus on autonomy, and not maximizing self-interest, we will
reject arguments that appeal primarily to protecting individuals
from their own bad judgment. As a value distinct from self
interest, autonomy-the right and ability to choose-would appear
to protect an individual's right to choose poorly as well as to choose
wisely.
In addition to separating the concepts of "autonomy" and "self
interest," the concept of autonomy itself can be conceptualized in
several different distinct manners, and these differing conceptions
again push us in different directions in hard cases. As Kim
recognizes, "[a]utonomy, like consent, is a multi-faceted concept."8
By calling autonomy "multi-faceted," Kim invokes Joel
Feinberg's incisive discussion of the many different values that
autonomy can serve to vindicate. These include:
•

"the capacity to govern oneself or competence" 9

•

"the condition of self-government," for "[a]n
autonomous individual ... is authentic to himself and
self-directed" 10

•

"an ideal of character" that "derives from the
condition of self-government and includes virtues

8. NANCY 8. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 53 (2019).
9. Id. (citing JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW 27-51 (1986)).
10. Id. at 53-54.
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such as self-reliance, personal responsibility, moral
authenticity and integrity" 11
•

"sovereign authority to govern oneself or the 'right' to
personal sovereignty" 12

Relatedly, Kim cites JS Mill for the proposition that "the goal
of freedom was utility," in the '"largest sense, grounded on the
permanent interests of man as a progressive being."' 13 The concept
of "man as a progressive being" is based on the concept that it is
important "not only what men do, but also what manner of men
they are that do it." 14
Joseph Raz has further articulated this idea. Raz argues that
we value an individual's choices because "[a]utonomy is a
constituent element of the good life." 15 Raz embraces the view that
"it is the function of governments to promote morality," and that
"[m]orality is thought to be concerned with the advancement of the
well-being of individuals." 16
Individual well-being, in turn,
"consists in [the individual's] successful pursuit of valuable,
willingly embraced goals." 17
For Raz, individual well-being requires that the individual
"adopt and pursue goals because [she] believes in their
independent value." 18 "Autonomy means that a good life is a life
which is a free creation." 19 The "concern for autonomy is a concern
to enable people to have a good life."20
In contrast with this view of autonomy as based on self
actualization and self-government, autonomy can instead be
conceptualized as simply reflecting individual self-sovereignty.
This self-sovereignty view has been most vigorously advanced by
Joel Feinberg.
He argues that "sovereignty is basic and
underivative. Sovereignty is, in a sense, an ultimate source of
authority." 21 Feinberg explains that "to say that I am sovereign
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 54 (2019).

Id.
Id. (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 24 (1859)).
Id. (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 24 (1859)).
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 408 (1986).
Id. at 415, 267.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 412.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 412 (1986).
3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 48 (1986).
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over my bodily territory is to say that I, and I alone, decide (so long
as I am capable of deciding) what goes on there." 22 Just as state
sovereignty is ''basic and underivative," Feinberg views the
individual's right to autonomy as a "right of self-determination"
that is "entirely underiuatiue, as morally basic as the good of self
fulfillment itself." 23 "The life that a person threatens by his own
rashness is after all his life; it belongs to him and to no one else.
For that reason alone, he must be the one to decide-for better or
worse-what is to be done with it in that private realm where the
interests of others are not involved." 24
Feinberg recognizes that this conception of "sovereign
autonomy" has significant implications for the relationship
between the values of autonomy and liberty. If self-sovereignty is
a deontological value-an underivative birthright-then a
sovereign person may choose to sell or alienate some or all of her
physical body or her liberty. Feinberg acknowledges that while
"freedom is an important good in human life .... [i]t is very
important to recognize that freedom is one kind of good among
many, that persons have been known to get along well with very
little of it, and that rational persons are often willing to 'trade'
large amounts of it for goods of other kinds, including simple
contentment." 25 Accordingly, "[t]he dejure autonomous person will
surely reserve the right to 'trade off his de facto freedoms for goods
of other kinds, as measured on his own scale of values and
determined by his own judgments." 26
Kim rejects this outcome, arguing that "[t]he fact that a
person has control over his or her body is not the same thing as
being the 'owner' of it, which necessarily implies something
external to the self and which can be traded." 27 Kim quotes JS
Mill's famous argument that respecting a person's voluntary
choices does not entail allowing that person to forego that liberty,
for example by selling part of her body or liberty. As Mill states,
"the reason for not interfering ... with a person's voluntary
acts ... is concern for his liberty."28 "But by selling himself a slave,
he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 53 (1986).

Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 41 (2019).

Id. at 91 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 184 (1859)).
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that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very
purpose which is the justification of allowing to dispose of
himself." 29
For Feinberg, in contrast, "[t]here is no paradox ... when a
morally autonomous person exercises his sovereign right of self
government to diminish his own de facto freedom of action." 30
When we think of state sovereignty, Feinberg explains that "there
is neither conceptual nor (necessarily) moral difficulty when a
political state renounces some part of its sovereignty." 31
Accordingly, "[i]f we transfer the whole concept of sovereignty from
the nation to the person, then we should expect the same
implications for the personal forfeiture of autonomy." 32 For
Feinberg-but not for Kim-''[a] perfectly autonomous person
would have in Mill's words the 'power of voluntarily disposing of
his own lot in life,' even if that involved forfeiture of his de facto
freedom in the future." 33
Having canvassed these authorities offering different
conceptions of why consent and autonomy are valuable, Kim does
not definitively embrace any one theory (or combination of
theories). Rather, she articulates what she refers to as a more
''literal" definition of autonomy as "freedom to move, act or think
without assistance or constraint." 34 I will consider this definition
of autonomy, and further explore the competing underlying
justifications for consent, in the course of discussing two of Kim's
major contributions-a focus on Future Autonomy and the Regret
Principle.

II. CONSENTABILITY AND FUTURE AUTONOMY
One of Kim's major principles for evaluating consentability is
assessing that choice's impact on the individual's future autonomy.
Kim creates a hierarchy of autonomy interests and explains that it
serves as a "hierarchy of which interests if violated would most
diminish the future selfs options by constraining the future selfs
freedom to act and think independently." 35 The question of "future
29. NANCY s. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 91 (2019) (quoting
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 184 (1859)).
30. 3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 65 (1986).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 70.
Id.
Id. at 69.
NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 74 (2019).

Id. at 76.
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autonomy" is thus a central guiding principle throughout the
book. 36
Turning back to the underlying justifications for consent,
Kim's "future autonomy" principle appears to be grounded in the
importance of autonomy as opposed to self-interest. Her hierarchy
is not based on assessing which interests, if violated, would
diminish the future selfs self-interests, but rather future

autonomy.
The next logical question is which conception of autonomy
Kim is concerned with-autonomy as self-sovereignty, autonomy
as self-actualization, or something different? Kim explains her
hierarchy as follows:
[A] proposed activity would pose a threat to the consenter's
autonomy if it would limit the consenter's capacity to act and
think independently and without assistance. Under this
definition, a decision which provides more opportunities and
options for the consenter enhances autonomy, while one that
reduces them diminishes autonomy. This definition for the
purpose of determining the threat level to autonomy differs
from other definitions which focus on self-actualization. 37
The more literal, less conceptually rich nature of Kim's
definition of autonomy comes at a cost-a loss of depth and nuance
in application. For many individuals, projects of self-actualization
and self-formation commonly involve creating bonds that
significantly constrain our future selves. A young man's decision
to enter the priesthood entails accepting substantial restrictions
on his future selfs freedom to make other choices related to
vocation, intimate relationships, and fathering children, among
many others. But voluntarily accepting those burdens is part and
parcel of what makes joining the priesthood such an important and
profound vocational choice. Becoming a priest has a social and
religious depth and weight that far outweighs many other
vocational choices, such as choosing to become a car salesman for
a few years. The latter profession offers much greater future

36. See NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 74 (2019)
("Given the unpredictability and irrationality of human behavior, acts which limit
future capacity may promote one's present autonomy but risk limiting one's future
autonomy. 'J; id. at 121 ("These human fallibilities impair decision-making and may
lead to regretted actions which impair future autonomy.").
37. Id. at 74.
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freedom and flexibility-and, partly as a consequence, may be less
deeply meaningful.
Many significant choices in life are like this. Pursuing a
serious and deeply meaningful path-such as choosing a serious
career, choosing to marry, or choosing to have (or not to have)
children-are all decisions that open up certain future options
while foreclosing many others. A serious commitment to life-long
intimate partnership with one person entails abandoning
countless other future relationships, and yet also opens up the
opportunity for a relationship with a depth far beyond what any of
those many short-term relationships could provide.
Kim's version of autonomy means that "a decision which
provides more opportunities and options for the consenter
enhances autonomy, while one that reduces them diminishes
autonomy." 38 With respect to many important life decisions, it is
not clear that this framework is helpful or desirable. It may not be
helpful because the "opportunities and options" created by one
choice versus the other may be very difficult to assess or compare.
It may not be desirable because some choices that seem, on
balance, to reduce future "opportunities and options"-such as
entering the priesthood, or committing to life-long marriage-are
valuable choices of self-actualization, even if they limit more
superficial "opportunities and options."
Instead of embracing "self-actualization" as the core value
underlying autonomy, Kim could instead embrace Joel Feinberg's ·
conception that an individual's right to autonomy flows directly
from his or her self-sovereignty. After all, "[t]he life that a person
threatens by his own rashness is after all his life; it belongs to him
and to no one else." 39 The most striking aspect of Feinberg's
"autonomy as self-sovereignty" conception is the degree to which it
resists external assessments of whether the individual is
benefiting in some way from their autonomy. With Mill's "self
interest" conception, the central question is whether the
individual's choices are serving their self-interest. But from a
perspective of self-sovereignty or self-ownership, in contrast, there
is little room to assess whether the state of being autonomous is
"good for" the individual or not. She is not autonomous in virtue of
the benefit it bestows on her, and thus she remains autonomous

38. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 74 (2019).
39. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 59

(1986).
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even if no benefit can be found. Kim rejects this outcome, arguing
that "[t]he fact that a person has control over his or her body is not
the same thing as being the 'owner' of it, which necessarily implies
something external to the self and which can be traded." 40
In contrast with Kim's more ''literal" definition of autonomy,
Joseph Raz powerfully makes the case that self-actualization-the
ongoing human project of creating and embodying coherent and
meaningful values and choices-is the most fundamental good of
autonomy, and is the good that society should seek to further in
the law of consent. If so, then furthering and protecting that right
to self-actualization is more important-more fundamental-than
the literal freedom to think, act, and move without assistance.
Under autonomy as self-actualization, decisions should not be
judged according to whether they will constrain a future selfs
freedom to move, act, or think, but rather whether those decisions
are part of the process of developing and embodying one's own
values and goals.
In this regard, Raz identifies four conditions of personal well
being. First, well-being "consist[s] of the successfully pursuit of
goals which [the individual] has or should have." Second, the
individual "adopt[s] and pursue[s] goals because [she] believes in
their independent value." Third, an individual's "well-being
depends, at the deepest level, on his action reasons and his success
in following them." Fourth, "a person's well-being depends to a
large extent on success in socially defined and determined pursuits
and activities." 41
These criteria provide a basis to evaluate individual decision
making that perhaps better captures what matters to us about our
autonomy than simply the ability to move, act, or think without
assistance or constraint.

III. THE REGRET PRINCIPLE
Another major component of Kim's conceptual project is what
she deems the "Regret Principle." She argues that consentability
should be limited based on the consenting party's future regret. In
particular, Kim explains, "[t]he regret which is the focus of this
book has a permanent negative effect on our happiness and well
being because it limits or damages our future autonomy in a

40. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 41 (2019).
41. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 308-09 (1988).
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significant way." 42 Kim argues "that the state should intervene to
minimize or avoid this type of profound regret, which I will refer to
as the Regret Principle." 43 This Regret Principle illuminates a
central tension in consent theory, between decisions today and
impacts of those decisions tomorrow, and offers guidance on how to
navigate that tension.
Here Kim starts with the common liberal premise that "[i]n a
free society, the government should respect individual autonomy
and restrict very little between consenting adults." 44 This does, of
course, require that the state must "ensure that both adults are
actually consenting."45
Drawing on social psychology and behavioral economics, Kim
stresses the "myriad ways in which [human cognitive processing]
can fail to serve the best interests of the decision-maker," and also
the reality that "human beings are highly susceptible to social
influence, context and pressure." 46 Social science research "has
revealed that human beings are prone to heuristics and biases,
have difficulty assessing very complex information, make
impulsive or ill-considered choices under time constraints, and are
manipulable and subject to social pressures." 47 These problems,
Kim claims, "may lead to regretted actions which impair future
autonomy." 48 All of this, Kim argues, suggests that "the foundation
upon which much of the thinking about autonomy was based is
cracked and crumbling." 49
As with the Future Autonomy principle, Kim's Regret
Principle can be usefully interrogated by returning to the different
underlying purposes of consent articulated above. Her criticisms
of individual decision-making, based on the flaws and biases
evident in human decision-making, seem to operate under the
"Self-Interest" framework. Her criticisms reflect a concern about
whether individual consent is advancing self-interest-whether
individuals are, indeed, the best judge of their own interests. She
argues, for example, that the failures in human decision-making
show that individual decisions "can fail to serve the best interests
42. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 57 (2019).

43. Id.
44. Id. at 117.

45. Id.
46. Id.
4 7. NANCY S. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 121 (2019).

48. Id.
49. Id. at 117.
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of the decision-maker." 50 This is an argument most explicitly about
self-interest, not autonomy. Yet at other points Kim appears to
focus not on self-interest as such, but on autonomy. For example,
she argues that the problems of human decision-making "may lead
to regretted actions which impair future autonomy." 51
If we care fundamentally about the value of autonomy for
furthering self-government and self-actualization, we will view
Kim's list of human frailties differently, and it is less evident that
those problems mean that the foundation of autonomy "is cracked
and crumbling." 52 Autonomy as "Self-Actualization" is based on
the idea that "[a]n autonomous individual ... is authentic to
himself and self-directed." 53
Relatedly, the state of being
autonomous promotes a certain "ideal of character" that "includes
virtues such as self-reliance, personal responsibility, moral
authenticity and integrity." 54

The problems with individual decision-making that Kim
catalogues call into question whether individual decisions always
"serve the best interests of the decision-maker," 55 but they do not
necessarily undermine the values of Self-Actualization. Even if my
decisions can be flawed by self-deception and cognitive bias, by
choosing autonomously I am nevertheless developing my own
character as a choosing moral agent-developing my self-reliance,
embodying the moral authenticity and integrity that comes from
being responsible for my own choices.
Likewise, if we adopt Feinberg's view that autonomy is
grounded on Self-Sovereignty, we again would have less reason to
conclude that the frailties of human decision-making were eroding
the foundations of consent and autonomy. Self-Sovereignty is not
based on the presupposition that individuals make good and
unbiased decisions about their own interests, but rather on the
view that "[t]he life that a person threatens by his own rashness is
after all his life; it belongs to him and to no one else. For that
reason alone, he must be the one to decide-for better or worse-

50. NANCY 8. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 117 (2019).
51. Id. at 121.
52. Id. at 117.

53. Id. at 54.
54. Id.
55. NANCY 8. KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 117 (2019).
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what is to be done with it in that private realm where the interests
of others are not involved." 56
Accordingly, it is worth questioning whether Kim is in fact
primarily interested in advancing each individual's self-interests,
or whether she is primarily interested in impairments of future
autonomy. Individual regret is ordinarily thought of as related to
errors about self-interest, but not necessarily about impairments
to autonomy.
Profound regret about a past decision often reflects a present
judgment that a past decision-such as the choice to pursue one
career rather than another-failed to correctly serve one's self
interest. I might experience profound regret because I chose to be
a lawyer, when in retrospect I believe I would have been so much
happier as a dentist. Knowing what I know now, I understand
in a way that my past self did not-that the practice of law does
not serve my self-interests, because it does not fit my personality
traits. In contrast, I would be much happier working as a dentist.
This type of regret is based on a diminution of my own self
int'erest, but it does not represent an impairment to, or violation
of, my autonomy. To the contrary, my decision to be a lawyer may
have been fully voluntary and autonomous--entirely my own
decision. This regret does not stem from any autonomy violation
(past, present, or future), but from a frank self-realization that
one's own prior, fully voluntary decisions badly served one's own
self-interests. This is perhaps the most bitter type of regret, as
there is no one else to blame but your (past) self.
At other times, I might view some results negatively not so
much because a decision failed to serve my self-interests, but
because of violations to my own autonomy. Here too, however,
there is a difference between regret about past autonomy
impairments and regret about past decisions that have led to
future autonomy impairments.
I might regret the fact that I became a lawyer rather than a
dentist due to the fact that my parents insisted that I attend law
school rather than dental school, and went so far as to agree to pay
for law school while refusing to pay for dental school. This, I might
argue, impaired my past autonomy-my freedom of decision
making. This sort of misfortune, however, is often described with
56. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 59
(1986).
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terms like resentment or anger rather than "regret." I may have
amassed material wealth and comfort as a result of my legal career
(my material interests were well-served), while still suffering a
bitter anger that my parents so heavily impaired by past decision
making (my autonomy was violated).
Kim yokes these different problems together when she
contends that "[t]hese human fallibilities impair decision-making
and may lead to regretted actions which impair future
autonomy." 57 But (1) "regretted actions" and (2) "impair[ed] future
autonomy" are separate concerns. It is not clear whether Kim's
Regret Principle requires both future regret and impairment to
future autonomy. Possibly, Kim is simply claiming that future
regrets are commonly associated with impairments to future
autonomy. In any event, it is worth emphasizing that these two
concerns are separate.
There is thus a tension, in some cases, between Kim's concerns
of "Regret" and "Future Autonomy Impairments." One way to limit
future regret is for the state (or some other third party or
institution) to intervene in individual decision-making to prevent
choices that badly serve our own interests while fostering (or
forcing) choices that advance those self-interests. This would often
entail an autonomy violation to present, and also perhaps to
future, autonomy-while at the same time minimizing future
regret.
In contrast, greater protections for individual autonomy often
create greater opportunities for regret. The project of autonomous
self-actualization is meaningful, in part, because of the genuine
opportunities for mistakes or failures. The visionary artist-a
paradigm of individual self-actualization-may end up finding
great meaning and satisfaction in creating works of art that inspire
generations. Or she may end up isolated, unrecognized, and a
failure.
Returning to Raz's "Self-Actualization" concept, individual
choices can be valuable because they allow each of us to live a life
of our own choosing, to adopt values and goals and then live a life
as a responsible moral agent in pursuit of those values and goals.
This may result in regrets-choices that failed to achieve the
desired successes. But regret is, in a sense, part and parcel of
living one's own life, being allowed to choose, create one's own
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identity, and be the sort of being that has authorship and agency
over one's own life. This is, perhaps, worthier of moral valuation
than the brute fact of self-ownership, and more worthwhile than
simple advancement of self-interest.

*

*

*

This response has only engaged with a few of the myriad
concepts and practical applications contained in Consentability.
Kim's book engages productively with many additional areas, such
as private contract, fraud and deception, and reducing
opportunism. On the specific concepts addressed in this essay,
hopefully it is evident from the discussion above that Kim's work
is a serious and deeply-informed effort to grapple with the
complexities of consent and autonomy, and offers a mix of
conceptual tools that help sharpen and illuminate the boundaries
and limitations of consent.

